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PANEL II: RECENT RULE CHANGES
AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS
PANEL 2: RECENT RULE CHANGES AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS
M = Moderator
P = Panelist
A = Attendee
M: Welcome back, everyone. Our second panel, Recent Rule Changes
and Legal Developments, will be moderated by M2, a professor of law at
[Redacted] and an associate reporter of the Restatement of the Law of the
US Law of International Commercial [and Investor-State] Arbitration. I will
hand it over to M2 to do the introductions for the rest of the panelists.
M2: Thank you, M, and thanks for your hospitality, the Law Review’s
hospitality. Thank you, all, for being here in this lovely DC winter weather,
which at least is rain rather than ice. Our panel is on, I will confess, current
events. So, a little bit of everything, but I do think there are some themes
that I will talk about in just a second. First, I do want to introduce the rest of
the panelists, and we will go down from my right, immediate right, further
to the right, and we are going to be very brief. So, following M1’s lead. P4
is a partner at [Redacted]. Then, next to him, is P3, who is an associate at
[Redacted] and an American University alum. The only college mention
there will be. P2, partner at [Redacted], next to her, and then P1, an associate
at [Redacted] next to him. Frankly, the most important qualification that all
of them have is they are all actively involved in international arbitration
practice and international dispute resolution more generally.
The panel, as I said, could be seen as a catch-all of current legal
developments, but I think the underpinnings are a cross-current of political
and market events. I mean, hopefully — you may . . . have a sense [that]
there is a lot of competition among jurisdictions and institutions to attract
arbitration business, so some of the topics that will be talked about today are
changes in institutional rules. In part, that is in response to competitive
pressures. Similarly, jurisdictions, like countries, revise, to the extent that
they can, national laws to try to attract arbitration business. The United
States has not been really successful at that since the key governing statute,
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the Federal Arbitration Act,1 is approaching its 100th anniversary. A few
changes, but not many. But the Restatement is a way to try to help the US
law along in ways that Congress hasn’t been able to do. But the
countercurrent is, arbitration is not always popular, and so there are
countervailing political pressures to reduce, regulate, the arbitration process.
I think we may see some of that — we are seeing some of that — in the
United States right now. That seems to be a way that the individual
presentations you’ll be hearing in just a second, connect. So, we are going
to start with P4 who’s going to talk about the Restatement project.
P4: Thanks, M2. I will point [out] immediately that M2 is one of the
reporters on the Restatement project and therefore knows a great deal more
about it than I do. He’s reserving his fire to disagree with me after I stick
my neck out. Back when I was in law school, which coincided roughly with
the end of the last ice age, you walked into the library, and immediately by
the door was a bookshelf with a handsome set of books called “The
Restatement of the Law” of this and “The Restatement of the Law” of that.
Everybody knew they were there. Whatever subject you were studying,
there was a Restatement, and it was a terrific resource, and the books were
never on the shelves because somebody was always using them somewhere.
Now, nobody has books, and I am not sure how accessible the Restatement
is online. So, consider this, to some extent, a commercial for the Restatement
because it does not exist yet. It is about to come into existence, and it is
going to be a huge asset to everyone who practices international arbitration.
So, for starters, since the books do not exist and the libraries are gone,
what is a Restatement? I hope some of you know, maybe even most of you
know, that Restatements of the Law are produced by a group called The
American Law Institute, which is a very venerable [institution]. It is
probably 100 years old, isn’t it, M2? A group of mostly law professors,
judges, and practicing lawyers in varying proportions. The law professors
tend to dominate the discussions, [and] take it upon themselves, on a
particular topic, to put together — a “restatement” is a carefully chosen word
— of what the courts have said on that subject. It is basically a practical way
of coping with common law. I’ve found often that European lawyers trying
to get a grip on American law cling to it because it is the closest thing to a
code that we have. Up to now, there has been no such resource for arbitration
law, even though arbitration law in this country is largely a creature of
common law. The Arbitration Act, in many ways, resembles the Sherman
Act2 in that it pronounces broad principles, but it does not provide much
1. 9 U.S.C. § 1–2 (2018).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).
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detail. Over the ninety-three years that the act has been in effect, it has
accumulated a very thick crust [of] judicial opinions, but it takes a while to
sort through them and find the ones that matter to whatever issue you’re
dealing with. The Restatement is finally about to impose some discipline
and order on that subject.
The Restatements are drafted principally by a very small group — in this
case, five — called Reporters, who are all law professors, chaired by George
Bermann of Columbia University. Then it is massaged, critiqued, whatever,
by a larger group of about twenty-five Advisors, [of] which I have the
privilege to be one. Then it is subjected to further critique by a larger, about
a 200-lawyer group called the Members Advisory Group. Then, eventually,
provision-by-provision, it is voted on at the annual meeting of the ALI,
which often has 1,000 [or more] people in attendance.
The structure of the Restatement is to state principles of law distilled from
the cases very succinctly in what’s called black letter, which is literally — in
the old days, at least, when there were books — it was large black type,
which tried to capture in a sentence a principle that summed up [the] law on
a subject. Followed by a couple of pages of what are called comments, which
explain the black letter. Followed by often many pages of what are called
reporter’s notes in smaller print, which give you the case citations and
explain the pros and cons, which way the courts have gone, and why the
black letter statement is a reasonable summary, if you will, of what the courts
have said. Every once in a while, the reporters get a little adventurous, and
the black letter departs a bit from what the courts have said.
This project was launched in 2007, so, it is twelve years old. It is
scheduled to be subjected to a final vote [of] the ALI membership at the
annual meeting in May, so it is just about to be launched, and I hope shortly
thereafter will appear in a handsome bound [set] of books that probably only
three or four of us will actually ever possess. But somewhere, it will be
online. So, to illustrate the process a little bit and also to see if I can provoke
M2 into — I’ve never seen M2 lose his temper, actually — but at least into
responding; [let me] just pick one small point, which happens to be the one
small point [on] which I disagree with the learned reporters.
I won’t try to describe the structure of the Restatement except to
emphasize that it deals [mostly] with international commercial arbitration.
So, the starting point I hope all of you appreciate, and I think you’re all either
lawyers or law students, is that that means that it comes into American law
[through] the gateway of Chapter Two of the Federal Arbitration Act, not
Chapter One.3 Although, those of you who have dealt with [that] Chapter
3. See generally Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208 (2018). The gateway
will be Chapter Three, if the applicable treaty is the Panama Convention. See 9 U.S.C.
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Two understand Chapter One comes back in the backwash with almost every
question,4 but the basic structure is international. How do the courts deal
with, basically, the application of the New York and Panama conventions
and the very rare . . . international case, that isn’t governed by either? How
do they distinguish between cases governed by the convention that are seated
in the United States, as opposed to cases seated outside the United States?
How do they deal with the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate [and] with
enforcement of awards, with setting aside of awards, and all of the reasons
courts get involved?
Because the Restatement sees itself as a manual for judges, it does not tell
you how to conduct an arbitration. It does not tell the arbitrators how they
should behave. It is a resource for judges confronted with an issue of law
involving an arbitration. So, one of the subjects tackled is, when a court has
to rule on a question of arbitrability, and this is especially important at the
beginning of a case when a court is enforcing an arbitration agreement or
declining to. [If] the contract that contains the arbitration clause incorporates
the institutional rules of an arbitration [institution], such as the American
Arbitration Association, which contains a provision that says, “Arbitrators
may rule on their own jurisdiction,” [d]oes the court consider that [provision]
a delegation of the power to pronounce on questions of arbitrability to the
arbitrators or does it not?
Questions of arbitrability come in many flavors. The Supreme Court has
sliced and diced them into procedural and substantive, and issues that
Professor Bermann calls “gateway issues.” Others that he calls “twilight
issues.” There are any number of them, but the core question is when a court
gets one of these, does the court say, “That’s for the arbitrators”? The court
almost always would. For example, if the question is, “Has the condition
precedent been complied with?” Or does [the judge] say, “That’s for a
court”? The court almost always will, when the question is, “Is the party
before me one of the signatories to the contract?”
The question that resulted in a lot of controversy in the Restatement [is
what to do] when the arbitration clause incorporates by reference . . .
arbitration rules that give arbitrators the power to pass on their jurisdiction,
“Does that constitute what the Supreme Court in the first options case called
clear and unmistakable evidence of an intention to delegate [to] the
arbitrators the power to decide the arbitrability question at the front end?”5
When the question is, “Do you compel arbitration . . . ? Or does it not? This
§ 301 et seq. (2018).
4. See 9 U.S.C. § 208 (2018).
5. See Howsam v. Dean Writter Reynolds Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002); First
Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
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is one where almost every circuit in the United States, the Second Circuit,
the DC Circuit, the First Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, has said, “You have such
clauses in the ICC rules and the UNCITRAL rules, the LCIA rules, as well
as the AAA rules, that the presence of such a clause constitutes clear and
unmistakable evidence of intention to delegate.”6 The Tenth Circuit and the
reporters of the Restatements say, “No, it doesn’t.”7 The Reporters, at least,
start to explain the reason; they say that [such a clause] amounts to what the
French call positive competence — that the arbitrators have the power to
decide — but it does not include what the French call negative competence,
which excludes the courts. So, the critique is because it does not specifically
exclude the court from intervening, it does not delegate as clearly and
unmistakably the power to pronounce to the arbitrators.
Now, the argument I have been trying to make for a long time, and I
haven’t got time to go into detail, but it is basic federal law that parties may
not by agreement confer on a district court or take away from a district court
its jurisdiction. To me, therefore, to say, “The parties must have specifically
agreed to exclude court jurisdiction,” means the parties must have
specifically agreed to do something which they may not do. Also, as a
practitioner, and I’ve been practicing [in] this [area of] law for a very long
time, I can tell you that the rule of the Second Circuit, which says, “This goes
to the arbitrator, reviewable after the award by a court, but, in the first
instance, goes to the arbitrator,” it means your case moves along smoothly
and quickly without a two-year detour into the courts to get a ruling. This is
a point very difficult to get through to professors. So, I . . . have to tell you
the Restatement lays out the law [on] this meticulously, it cites all of the
cases, it explains the reasoning pro and con. It is a fantastic resource — just
do not assume it is always right.
M2: Thank you, P4. I am not so provoked that I am going to jump in right
now and respond because, frankly, P4’s description of the Restatement
position was better than I probably could have done. So, we can talk more
about [this] in question-answer if people want to. In the meantime, we will
move on to P2 who will be talking about some of the political cross-currents,
I think, and his topic is the new NAFTA, also known as USMCA in its very
catchy parlance. So, anything but NAFTA, I guess, is maybe the name for
it.
P2: . . . . P4, . . . I think [the Cold War] was the most pivotal moment in
6. E.g., Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution Co., Ltd, 398 F.3d 205, 209-10 (2d Cir.
2005).
7. See Reporters’ Notes to Sections 2.8 and 2.9 of the Restatement of the Law –
The U.S. Law of International Commercial and Investor-State Arbitration (proposed
final draft, April 24, 2019).
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post-World War II history, at least until now. We will see what happens
next. One of the reasons that it was critical was because of a broad . . . policy
consensus, known as the Washington Consensus. Basically, because . . .
policies of multilateral institutions here as well as policies of the U.S.
government in the aftermath of the Cold War, regarding the best way to try
to develop economies. If you looked at Eastern Europe after the end of the
Cold War, you saw a massive transformation both politically and
economically . . . . You saw the same in Latin America . . . . In that context,
NAFTA is . . . a watershed moment. And one of the things that is particularly
interesting about NAFTA, if you look at the signing of NAFTA . . . , you see
not only Bill Clinton, but you see former Democratic and Republican
presidents, you see Democratic and Republican leaders of the House.
Democratic and Republican leaders of the Senate all joining together in this
moment of Washington Consensus. A far cry from where we stand today in
the city of Washington.
. . . [T]he core theme of this conference is whether arbitration is friend or
foe of corporations. I think that you’ve got to understand NAFTA from a
few angles . . . .
If you look at the preamble of NAFTA, and indeed most investment
protection treaties, it is clear that the aim is not to help corporations or states,
but rather to promote development. For example, I once was in a hearing,
and an opposing party, which was a corporation, said, “This treaty exists to
protect investors.” That is one component of what an investment protection
treaty or NAFTA does. Another component, of course, broadly construed,
is to nurture development, in the broadest sense over a long period of time.
That was [part of] the Washington Consensus that through openness of
investment, free trade, creating new vehicles for promoting the rule of law,
we would help states, corporations, citizens, and all stakeholders.
One of the things that is a critical element, of course, of NAFTA is access
to international arbitration. . . . [W]hat happen[ed] if there was a dispute
between an investor and a state prior to these treaties? In most instances,
there was no clear framework for resolving those disputes. So, you can look
back through the 20th century, and you can find examples littered through
history of the problem of not having a clear framework for resolving crossborder disputes other than the most obvious default — go to the local court
— which was not a sufficient risk management tool to facilitate investment.
So, think of it in the simplest terms. If you go to the World Cup, you need
some basic rules, you need to know where the arbitrators are going to be to
resolve your problems. So, the emergence of investment arbitration was
specifically designed to create a way to resolve problems derived from crossborder investment, thereby incentivize cross-border investment because you
would know how you could try to resolve your dispute. I would add one
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more angle to that — to de-politicize those disputes, which can often be
highly contentious, high profile. A lot of the matters that I have worked on
over the past twenty-five years show up on the front page of international
newspapers. It just happened a couple of days ago. So, putting a more
neutral forum to resolve these disputes. Now, that is not only of benefit to
investors, it is a benefit to states because it is a burden on states to have
diplomatic pressure, political pressure, coming from the United States, the
United Kingdom, or whatever government they may be dealing with in trying
to resolve a dispute related to foreign investment.
One of the interesting things about the era of the Washington Consensus
was after NAFTA, the dream was much bigger. The vision was that NAFTA
was a step toward what would become the FTAA — the Free Trade
Agreement of the Americas. So, we start off with NAFTA: we’ve got
Canada, United States, Mexico, and then we will move on throughout the
rest of the region. Now, that never happened. Instead, what happened over
a period of time was a series of bilateral agreements and CAFTA, the Central
American version of NAFTA. Then you had treaties with Chile, treaty with
Peru, with Columbia. So, it was done on a bilateral basis but not a regional
integration basis until the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
The . . . Trans-Pacific Partnership . . . was theoretically on the verge
signature and ratification . . . prior to the presidential election. The big focus
is usually on, “What does it mean for China?” Which was not, and is not,
part of the TPP. But the fascinating thing about the TPP is that it effectively
constituted a new NAFTA and a free-trade agreement of the Americas. For
the first time you saw likeminded countries, Canada, United States, Mexico,
Peru, Chile, aligning on a free trade agreement that spans the western
hemisphere. The vision was that once TPP would be in place, others would
follow. Most certainly Columbia would have come, Panama would have
come, maybe even the post-Kirchner era of Argentina would have come.
That is particularly noteworthy because it reflected twenty-five years,
almost, after NAFTA . . . a victory for the Washington Consensus, as well as
the reasonable modernization of components of NAFTA.
. . . . What has played out over the last couple of years has been basically
a path to see what happens after the TPP, which basically died a difficult
political death really crossing party lines. It is noteworthy that it has been a
risk . . . that there could be a hard exit from NAFTA. Hard exit just like a
hard [Br]exit from the EU for England, really. What are the other states that
have had hard exits or terminations, enunciations, of these kinds of
investment protection treaties? They have been Venezuela of Hugo Chavez,
Ecuador of Rafael Correa, and Bolivia of Evo Morales. You can see these
explosions, which were basically movements away from these treaties and
this consensus. . . .
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. . . . In many ways, there are components of the new NAFTA that are
TPP elements repackaged and sold differently. But what is particularly
noteworthy is that, for the first time, the United States has taken a significant
step away from its position of the past twenty-five years with respect to
investment arbitration. Now, there have long been debates about the efficacy
of investment arbitration. We can address those in question time, if you like,
but on a bipartisan basis, administration after administration has favored
investment arbitration. Now, for the first time, through Chapter 14 of the
USMCA,8 we see the United States taking a step away from investment
arbitration, . . . restricting the scope of investment arbitration. What has yet
to be seen is does this mark the end of the Washington Consensus? A
permanent move by the United States away from that Consensus? Or is it
simply a hiccup in that road? That is what the fight will play out right here
in Washington in the next year, as we see what direction we are going to
head. It is . . . tied up with a lot of broader questions about globalization and
where things head next for corporations, for states, for the United States, and
for . . . people. Thank you.
M2: So, moving from the broad question of whether in fact there will be
investment arbitration. P1’s presentation will address those features of
investment arbitration and . . . changes by [those] administering [investment]
arbitrations. One quick note on the Restatement: it actually does have a
chapter on investor-state arbitrations, but because we only focus on the role
of courts relative to the arbitration process, [the relevance here is] very low.
So, it is there, and there are parts of it that I think have important
contributions, but it is not as important as ICSID. With that interlude, my
apologies.
P1: Thank you. So, I am going to pick up where P2 left off. Like he
mentions, my discussion [is] quite related with his because I am going to be
discussing the amendments to the ICSID rules. The ICSID administers
seventy percent of investor-state arbitrations, so it is a very significant
development that ICSID is amending its rules, that it is doing so in a very
long process. The current set of rules is from 2006,9 so this is the first time
in thirteen years that ICSID is doing this, but it is really the most significant
revision that ICSID has done for fifty years. Just to put this into context,
ICSID, as you know, is down the street, it is at the World Bank. They
8. United States — Mexico — Canada Free Trade Agreement, USTR (Nov. 30,
2018), https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexicocanada-agreement.
9. See International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID
Convention, Regulations and Rules, 99–128, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/
resources/2006%20CRR_English-final.pdf.
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administer cases, investor-state arbitrations, and they derive their power
[from] the ICSID convention, which has 154 member states. Now, you
might ask the question, “Why is it that they are amending the rules and not
the ICSID convention itself if the[re] are big foundational issues that they
need to deal with?” The answer to that is because it would be extremely
difficult to amend the ICSID convention because we would have to get all
154 of the countries to agree, and then they would have to go through the
ratification process of ratifying the [revised] treaty. Whereas, with NAFTA,
for example, which P2 just discussed, we have three countries. That in and
of itself has been very difficult and contentious. He mentioned the
ratification process is certainly not certain at this point.
So, broadly speaking, why is it that ICSID has decided to amend its rules?
ICSID has done it because it wants to modernize the rules. It wants to put
things in more plain language. It wants to eliminate inconsistencies between
the different language versions of the rules in French, English, and Spanish.
In a more mundane sense, it wants to reorganize the numbers because they’re
not necessarily logical in the way that they’re numbered. ICSID has also
revised more than just the arbitration rules. That’s what I am going to talk
about. But they’ve also revised their administrative regulations. They’ve
revised a separate set of rules, which we refer to as the “additional facility
rules,” which appl[y] to either the state involved or the national involved, if
not from a member state.
The process to date started in 2016. ICSID has gotten comments, both
from the states, which have to end up agreeing with it, two-thirds of what
they call the Administrative Council, it has to agree with the amendment at
the end of the day. If you look online, and this is something that is really
pretty interesting, you can find on ICSID’s website comments that have been
posted from all types of stakeholders in investor-state arbitration. This goes
beyond states: it includes practitioners, law firms; it includes thinktanks; it
includes professors. For example, Professor Franck, here at American
University, has submitted a very thoughtful letter that is posted right up there
on the ICSID website. It includes arbitrators including, for example, Charles
Brower, who I worked with for several years. It includes bar associations.
It includes a wide, wide group of people who have taken the time to think
about this and write out detailed comments. The process moving forward is
that we have a draft set of the new rules as of August of last year, and most
likely a vote will take place either this year or next year. So, it is a fairly
long process.
So, without getting into the weeds too much, basically the types of
amendments that ICSID has made to the rules include things like the
following. The evidentiary aspect of the rules [is] largely unchanged, largely
also something that is not too controversial. There is more transparency in
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the new rules. Where do we see this? For example, in the publication of
awards. The default position now is that awards from ICSID will be
published unless a party to the dispute objects within sixty days. Even if that
takes place, ICSID is going to publish a sanitized version of the award. We
also have a new provision on security for costs. Now, for those who aren’t
familiar with the concept of security for costs, it essentially means the
paradigm example is a claimant brings a case against a respondent state, the
respondent state thinks that the case is not strong. Not only that, but that the
claimant does not have a lot of financial resources. So, when the claimant
loses, the respondent’s state is hoping to get a cost award, and it does not
know that there is going to be any money there from the claimant to pay the
cost award. So, it requests that the tribunal force the claimant to pay a certain
amount up front, that way the money, the funds, are there after the fact in the
eventuality of a cost award. Previously, this was not something that was
reflected in the ICSID rules. In fact, ICSID tribunals have disagreed over
whether or not they had the authority to order security for cost. They
disagreed, also, on what the criteria were to do such an analysis. Now, we
have a new stand-alone rule that eliminates doubts on that — it allows a
tribunal to order [security for cost and] also includes criteria for that.
Whether or not this is going to make a difference, we have yet to see. Just
for a statistical, quick snapshot: I think there has been twenty cases where
parties have filed an application for security for cost and one successful one.
So, that may change, that may not change.
What else do we have? A lot of changes on the way that arbitrators are on
the constitution of the tribunal, not so much the appointment process but the
disclosure process. When an arbitrator is appointed, he or she typically must
disclose up front whether there are certain professional affiliations that he or
she has that might raise conflicts. ICSID has now proposed an enhanced
disclosure form — arbitrators have to disclose more than they used to,
including any links to third-party funders, which I am going to discuss in just
a moment. That has been the area that has received the most attention related
to the ICSID rules. Arbitrators also have to disclose — you may have heard
the term “double hatting,” which means that an arbitrator also serves as
counsel, as an expert, or a mediator. Then he or she will have to say the prior
cases in which he or she has done in the past so that the parties are aware of
any potential conflicts. One thing that I would note about that that is kind of
interesting is the new ICSID disclosure form for arbitrators only requires the
arbitrator to disclose prior cases where they’ve served in those capacities for
investor-state arbitrations, not for commercial arbitrations. That raises a lot
of questions. We will see how that plays out, but there are plenty of conflicts
that could also arise from commercial arbitrations. There are also
commercial arbitrations that are really investor-state arbitrations that look
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like commercial arbitrations. You have a state-owned entity, for example,
on the other side or [a] state on the other side.
Challenges — there has also been a lot of changes to challenges. One
thing that makes ICSID quite unique is the process reflected in the ICSID
convention for a challenge when a party wants to remove an arbitrator. They
file the challenge, and the people who decide that challenge in the first
instance are the other two arbitrators. ICSID is really unique in that sense,
it is reflected in the conventions. They really cannot get around that without
amending the convention, which is very difficult, as I discussed earlier. So,
what have they done? The convention language says, “If the two other
arbitrators are equally divided, they can kick it back to ICSID and let ICSID
decide.” We’ve seen in recent years that play out fairly often. Why? We
do not know if the arbitrators are necessarily equally divided, but they might
not necessarily want to stand in judgment of their colleague, so they prefer
to say they’re equally divided. Then, it pushes it back to ICSID to decide.
Well, the new rules deal with this issue by saying that the two arbitrators
who are sitting in judgment of their colleague can send a challenge back to
ICSID if they are unable to decide the challenge for any reason. That gives
them an out in order to do that, and it brings ICSID in line with other arbitral
institutions.
Lots of other things to discuss. I am going to just get on third-party
funding quickly. So, for those who aren’t aware, third-party funding means
that a party is receiving funding from a third party so that it can prosecute its
case. This usually happens for claimants in investor-state arbitrations. It is
something that has received a lot of — it is really come onto the scene [in]
the last, let’s say, ten years. It tends to be controversial. ICSID has a new
rule that says that if a party is receiving third-party funding, it must disclose
that. So, the issue is really the existence of the funding must be disclosed
and the name of the funder must be disclosed. Why has the rule received so
much attention? In large part because the definition of third-party funding
is extremely broad, it includes the provision of funds or other material
support not only to a party, but also to an affiliate of a party or to a law firm
of a party. So, just to give you an example [of] something that might fall
under that category: provision of funds or other material support. Other
material support, in that instance, could encompass, for example, a witness.
Would a party have to disclose that at the onset of the case? This provision
of third-party funding is also linked to the arbitrator declaration I discussed
recently, so arbitrators have to disclose if they have connections to anything
that falls under that definition of a third-party funder. Why do not I wrap it
up there, and we can discuss more.
M2: Very good. Thank you, P1. Our final presenter is P3, who is going
to bring us back to commercial arbitration and talk about changes to the rules
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of the ICC, International Chamber of Commerce.
P3: Thank you. Good morning, everyone. Thank you for coming. It is
great to see a full room. So, I wanted to round out this panel that has spanned
from legal developments, to investor-states, to general frameworks for
investment like P2 discussed, by talking a little bit about some recent rule
changes at the International Chamber of Commerce. Just to begin with a
little bit more of a broader context, this is specifically commercial
arbitration, business-to-business arbitration. If we think about arbitration,
friend or foe of corporations — well, I would argue it is a friend of
corporations. Why? Because corporations, like business, like the autonomy
to decide the rules of procedure. Arbitration gives you and your counterparty
the option to develop the rules pursuant to which you will resolve a legal
dispute.
Why else would you prefer arbitration over litigation? Well, there is a
presumption of more fair or equal treatment and playing field as opposed to
being subjected to the local courts of a different country or different
jurisdiction. The focus now is increased cost efficiency and increased time
efficiency. So, these are all reasons why business-to-business disputes
would be, perhaps in many cases, best resolved through commercial
arbitration as opposed to domestic litigation.
I am focusing on the International Chamber of Commerce because it really
is the preeminent arbitral institution to resolve commercial disputes in the
world. The ICC is based in Paris. Actually, the director of the Commercial
Arbitration [Center] here at the law school is a former secretary of the ICC.
It is just an incredible resource for all students. Since the ICC last revised
its rules in 2012, there is been a strong push to develop more regional
arbitration centers around the world. So, a lot of development in Asia, for
instance: we have the Hong Kong International Arbitration Center, the
Singapore International Arbitration Center, and various centers in Europe.
All of these centers are competing for business, they want to administer —
they want to be the institution administering the dispute. Again, going back
to cost and time efficiency, the ICC has tried to pick that up in its most recent
rule amendments of 2017. So, on March 1, 2017, new rules took effect.
These rules [amendments] are by and large nothing major, with one
exception.
The biggest development is the addition of expedited procedure provisions
that would apply [to] or be available for users of ICC arbitration. So, the
expedited procedure provisions constitute a separate annex to the rules, and
they have several interesting characteristics. So, first of all, when do they
apply? They apply as a default to any arbitration agreement, any arbitration
clause that was signed after March 1, 2017, the amount in dispute does not
exceed $2 million, and the parties haven’t opted out. So, if those
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requirements are satisfied, the expedited procedure would apply. What does
that mean? That means that the arbitration would be resolved by one sole
arbitrator as opposed to a tribunal of three.
There are other procedural differences as opposed to a standard ICC
arbitration. For instance, the expedited procedure dispenses with the Terms
of Reference. So, in ICC arbitration the Terms of Reference are a mutually
agreed upon document that basically contains all relevant aspects of the case:
who are the parties, who is counsel, what are the legal issues to be resolved
in the dispute, what is the language, what are our procedural rules on
witnesses and document production, other things like that. Because the
terms of reference are agreed upon by both parties and the tribunal, it can
take quite some time to negotiate and agree upon. So, the expedited
procedure dispenses with the terms of reference. In addition, the case
management conference that the arbitrator would hold, must take place
within fifteen days of the arbitrator receiving the case. Then, the final award
must be issued within six months of receiving the case of that case
management conference. So, six months to resolve a commercial dispute is
fast, but that is the intent here.
The arbitrator also has quite a bit of discretion to limit the scope of
submissions, to limit witnesses. For instance, they can decide to not have
witnesses participate in the arbitration so as to resolve the dispute more
expeditiously. In general, the arbitrator has quite a bit of discretion to
manage the case in an expeditious manner. So, this is something important
for users to be aware of because, again, it applies as a default. It can be opted
out of if the arbitration clause specifically states that the expedited procedure
shall not apply. I think the panel earlier this morning talked about drafting
arbitration clauses, and this is an illustration of how important it is to draft a
clause that is clear and draft a clause that is well informed by the institutional
rules that are going to apply to resolve that dispute.
I think, I am probably going to stop there. There are some other issues
that we can discuss in questions and answers, such as whether this affects
party autonomy, whether this is a good thing or a bad thing. But in short, the
expedited procedure that ICC is now offering is pretty forward-thinking in
the sense that while other regional institutions do have expedited procedures
available, the ICC is different to the extent that it applies as a default to all
claims that do not exceed $2 million in dispute — that is a very high
threshold. You’ll have other institutions that have a lower threshold, such as
$250,000 for really small claims, but this really is forward-thinking in that
respect. Thank you.
M2: Thank you, P3. So, the panel has done a great job of sticking to time
limit, which was intentional on our part, anyway, to give you all a chance to
raise issues you’re interested in. As you can tell from the presentations, there
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is a broad range of topics that have been raised, but a very wide range of
expertise among the panelists. So, at this point, basically, we will open the
floor for questions. Yes.
A1: Hi, my name is A1. I am a member of the Business Law Review. The
questions that I have pertain [to] what P1 was saying about the amendments
[to ICSID]. The first one that I have is: you had mentioned that ICSID will
now be publishing [awards, and the advantage of] international arbitration
was that these would be confidential. But taking away this confidentiality,
do you foresee parties being driven away from international arbitration and
going back to [the courts]?
P1: Great question. Thank you, A1. Can you hear me? Thanks, P4. It is
a great question. So, the answer is, we have to keep in mind the difference
between investor-state arbitration and commercial arbitration.
[C]onfidentiality has always been described as one of the main things that
attracts parties who want to arbitrate, especially businesses that do not want
all of their secrets getting out there. I mean, if you think about it, do you all
know what PACER is? For anyone who does litigation, you can go on
PACER, and you can find on a federal court docket virtually every exhibit
that is filed in a case, including all business information — anything at all.
When you’re in arbitration, you do not have to do that, you can have
everything remain confidential. The award will eventually come out. Now,
the award itself, when it gets enforced, will oftentimes have to go to court,
which means that it’ll be filed in court, which means that it will become
public anyway, but the key is that for most information you can try and keep
it confidential.
Let me get to your question, though, directly, which relates to ICSID.
ICSID only administers cases that relate to states, so it is investor-state
arbitration, and we have a fundamental difference between a dispute between
two business entities, or an investor and a state, because the public interest
is just more involved in an investor-state arbitration. You have taxpayer
money at stake. Investor-state arbitration has simply gotten a lot more
mainstream press in recent years because of that. There is a demand from
the public to want to know things about disputes relating to investor-state
arbitration. For that reason, you’ve seen a real push towards transparency. I
can tell you, for example, ICSID has also done things when they have a
hearing, which is what we call a trial, they will open it up to the public or
they will live-stream it, maybe slightly time delayed, so that anything that is
very sensitive could be removed. People can actually watch it on their
laptops, which you usually do not see in a case of just commercial interests.
P4: Can I jump in on that a second?
M2: Go ahead.
P4: Understand, most ICSID awards are already published. What they
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have done is flipped from an opt-in to an opt-out. So, at the moment, states
have to consent, which they sometimes do and sometimes do not do, under
the new rules as I understand it, they’ll have to opt-out specifically. The
hope is fewer of them will do that.
P1: I would just add one additional comment. The data for transparency
is central to arguments about the validity of investment arbitrations. I think
that if you look at the available cases, you will see that the vast majority of
investor-state decisions are publicly available. Most of them are published
with consent, or just one party releases them. So, you have available a very
broad range of cases that are critical resources and precedents for
understanding foreign investment and law related to foreign investment.
You can look at specific issues and decisions in some of the key cases. For
instance, we have Abaclat v. Argentina,10 and there was a critical decision in
January of 2010 that balanced transparency versus privacy and due process.
Because there were certain privacy issues, individuals who were involved
and their due process issues — in other words, there was a desire not to have
every single detail and piece of paper subject to public debate, but all
procedural decisions, key documents, and decisions were made public. So,
I think there has been a balancing act, and I can see movement towards
greater transparency.
M2: I will add on commercial arbitration. It is actually interesting: in the
United States, commercial arbitration is not confidential, it is private. So,
you cannot get to the dockets, as P1 said, other than for class arbitration,
where actually the AAA does put docket information in some of the filings
online. But it is secret, so you cannot attend the hearings like you could a
court case. But, unlike some countries, where when you agree to arbitration,
you imply the promise to keep everything about the process confidential —
that is not U.S. law. So, if you want to protect confidentiality in an
arbitration, you really need a separate contractual agreement to do so,
otherwise, the parties are free individually [to release information, although]
sometimes not awards. The institutional rules may address that, but
otherwise, there is no confidentiality obligation on the parties to the
arbitration proceeding unless there is a separate agreement. I mean, you see
this come up all of the time in some of the domestic cases involving
employment contracts and some of the #MeToo issues. Frankly, arbitration
is not confidential, unless there is a separate confidentiality provision. Most
of those contracts have separate confidentiality provisions, and that is really
what a lot of the concerns are about. Yes.
A2: [audience question]
10. Abaclat v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Procedural Order No. 3
(Confidentiality Order) (Jan. 27, 2010).
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P3: Yes, that is a good question. So, early in the case, by the case
management conference, the parties or the ICC court of international
arbitration can decide to remove the case from the expedited track. If by that
time, which is still very early on, if by that time it is apparent that the case is
going to require more time, it presents complicated issues, and is just not
going to be able to stick on this fast track. But in the case where the
arbitration proceeds under the expedited provisions; the fee structure
incentivizes, in a way, the arbitrator to stick to the given timeline. So, the
ICC actually started using its fee structures with the 2012 rules to incentivize
the timely and efficient administration of its cases. So, that is one way in
which the case is to remain on track. In addition, the language has now been
updated to reflect the party’s obligations to also manage and proceed with
the case in a time-efficient manner. If you look at the ICC arbitration rules,
there are case management tips in there that are strongly encouraged, such
as narrowing the issues in dispute, such as not producing witnesses or
extraneous information that really is not necessary to resolving the dispute.
So, there are tools at the disposal of parties and arbitrators to try and stick as
much as possible to that timeframe.
Now, in reality, I think we have to see how this plays out. The new rules
have only been in place for one year, so 2018 was the first year in which the
expedited provisions applied. I have to be honest with you, I have not looked
to see how that played out. But, certainly, that will be some area of interest
to see, “Is this working as intended?” One of the unique features of ICC
arbitration is the mechanism of internal review, so it is within six months
that the arbitrator must provide a draft award to the ICC court for review.
But then the ICC itself does an internal review of the award to make sure that
it satisfies: one, that it resolves the issues that were in dispute; two, that it
will be an unenforceable award under the New York Convention. Meaning,
there are no excess or manifestly excess — that the arbitrator has not
exceeded its authority, manifestly exceeded its authority, that the award does
not contravene fundamental public policy considerations of the seat. So,
really, the six months is the timeframe for the draft, and then the review
process takes place, which should be fairly short, but that can also be a little
bit long.
M2: P1, is ICSID doing anything about making sure or trying to speed the
process up?
P1: Yes. So, it is a great question. ICSID has now in the new rules
instituted deadlines for three types of decisions or awards. The first one is
what we used to refer to as 41(5). It now has a new rule number because
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they’ve shifted all of the numbers around. 11 It is 35(4) now. What it means
is you can file an application early on in a dispute and say, “This is manifestly
without legal merit.” A tribunal has to decide that, now, within two months.
For a preliminary question, a jurisdictional objection, has to happen within
six months. For everything else, which is really the award, it has to happen
within eight months. Then I ask, “Eight months [from] what?” I think it is
eight months [from] the last submission from the parties on the issue. Does
this have teeth? Not necessarily — it is a best effort standard. So, we do not
have something like the arbitrators are not going to get paid or they get paid
only after they issue the relevant award or decision.
But I would just also add in keeping with this broader trend for
transparency, the field is developing very quickly, and there is an initiative
called Arbitrator Intelligence, which you should know about. It is essentially
an online collection of information from people who use arbitration about
arbitrators. One of the questions that is asked of parties or their counsel after
a case is, “Were you satisfied with the speed with which the tribunal acted
and who were the tribunal members?” Arbitrators are aware of that as well,
so their reputation is something that will separately motivate them to want to
act quickly.
M2: I am on the board of directors at Arbitrator Intelligence. P1 is going
to get his check after the event. Arbitrator Intelligence is a non-profit, so
there actually [are] no checks, there is no budget. It collects data on
arbitrators after their performance, and then it’ll provide [that data] to clients
in reports and that would be how it sort of funds itself . . . . If you’re
interested, please do take a look [at Arbitrator Intelligence’s web page]. The
most important part of the process . . . is to get people to fill out the
questionnaires because there is, frankly, a lot of freeriding that goes on. So,
it is getting better, but we can always use more information. Let me just put
it that way — we are now to the point of early stages of coming up with draft
reports and that hopefully we will keep moving forward as well. So, thank
you, P1.
P4: M2, can I jump on that one?
M2: Of course.
P4: I couldn’t provoke you to a fight on the Restatement, [but] you [have
provoked] me on Arbitrator Intelligence. Strong caveat: Arbitrator
Intelligence relies on reports from parties. The AAA, with which I’ve been
associated for a very long time, has for years tried to collect feedback from
parties after the conclusion of a case on how the arbitrators, how the
institution, did. They get lots of feedback from the losing party, largely
11. See id. at 119.
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negative. It is very hard to get feedback from the prevailing party, which
presumably is happy. I suspect the same psychology is going to create a real
problem for Arbitrator Intelligence. It is going to collect a lot more
complaints than it is going [to] collect pats on the back. I would advocate
real caution in looking at anything from that source because I think the
psychology is very difficult to overcome. The loser complains, the winner
just takes the money and runs.
P4: I have one additional comment. Some of the aspirational elements for
the field that we’ve been discussing — the efficiency, transparency, diversity
of arbitrator appointments — these are things which at the level of looking
at the field, or looking at it academically, there is broad consensus in favor
of those elements. If you are managing a particular dispute, however, as an
advocate, your task is to succeed for your client. So, sometimes that
mitigates against these different elements. For example, it is easy to say,
“All cases should go very quickly.” Until you have a $2 billion dispute that
you’re very concerned could come out the wrong way. It is very easy to say
there should be diversity in arbitrator appointments, which I included in
every memorandum when I am proposing candidates to people. If you are a
board or a general counsel, whether it is a sovereign or a company, you have
to make a judgment call about the appointment that makes the most sense for
the particularities of your case, because your objective is to protect your
company, state, et cetera, not to generally promote healthy policies for the
field. The same could be said for transparency as well. I see the arbitrator
issue, in part, as related to transparency. I was at one event about a year ago,
and somebody said, “Isn’t it true that it would unfair if on one side [is] White
& Case.” They mentioned White & Case, but I could mention some other
firms of my colleagues. “White & Case has a lot of information about
arbitrators. It is a huge practice with many deeply experienced partners.
Wouldn’t that give an unfair advantage to the White & Case client?” To
which I said, “Exactly.”
M2: To which Arbitrator Intelligence says, “Yes, exactly.” So, P4’s
concern is absolutely a fair one, . . . people comment when they’re unhappy,
and that is going to be their focus. Clearly, it is something that we are aware
of and are working to try to combat through various means of collecting data
more systematically than just having random losing parties complain. I
guess, the other thing to keep in mind is this is all in comparison to
something. You cannot just say, “Yes, in the ideal world, we will have
perfect information.” There is information now, but as P4’s comment
illustrates very nicely, it is one-sided information. The whole idea of
Arbitrator Intelligence is trying to provide another side even for the White &
Case clients because there are a lot of other arbitrations out there, particularly
for the people who do not have White & Case. We’d all [like to] have [a]
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perfect world, but that is not the comparison. The comparison is, “What do
we have now and what can we do better?” So, to your question.
P4: That is a good question. I do not see that issue as relating so much to
efficacy, as I see it bringing ICSID in line with other practices because ICSID
is really sui generis in the fact that it goes to the other two arbitrators, which
creates this tension among the tribunal members. But to answer your
question as it relates to efficiency and challenges, the new rules do tackle
that because they say that challenges must now be brought — the old rules
said “promptly”, whatever that means. The new rules say it has to be within
twenty days of either the appointment or the knowledge that you got that led
to the challenge. That is bringing the challenge, and then the decision on the
challenge has to happen within thirty days, so, concrete deadlines are given.
I think the debate in the community is probably more, “What’s a meritless
challenge?” or, “What to do when parties bring repeated challenges?”
Because you still have to continue to follow this procedure. Every time,
you’ve got twenty days and then you have thirty days, this can happen. What
happens with challenges late in the proceeding, which can be more
disruptive?
Let me add a caveat on that. The ICSID rule, which is novel on this, says,
“For challenges, if the challenge is successful, then when a new arbitrator is
appointed to the tribunal, the parties have the option of asking the tribunal to
revisit every decision that the old tribunal came up.” Consider what that
means then for a successful challenge that happens late in the proceeding.
P4: Can I just weigh in on the subject of challenges? If you’re interested
in challenges, the LCIA, the London Court of International Arbitration, has,
as far as I know, a unique policy that it publishes decisions on challenges. If
an arbitrator is challenged at the LCIA, the LCIA court, which is the body
that passes on arbitration questions, will appoint an officer or a panel of three
to decide the challenge. Whoever gets that appointment has to write an
opinion explaining why the challenge was rejected or accepted. With the
names laundered, the LCIA has begun publishing those. It is developing a
body that you can look at to get explanations for why a challenge is accepted
or rejected.
M2: Other questions? Yes. Back in the corner.
A3: [audience question]
P2: Thank you for your question. First of all, I think that it is going to be
hard to put the genie back in the bottle because this has been a historic break
from U.S. policy over the past twenty-five years. Now, there is a benign
[way] to look at it, which is that it is normal over time to adapt, evolve,
constrain different dispute resolution mechanisms, be it at the treaty level or
be it at the level of rules. So, that much is unsurprising. But here, clearly,
what has motivated this change is something more fundamental, called
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sovereignty. Our perspectives that this Administration and this U.S. Trade
Representative have with respect to sovereignty and submitting the acts of a
sovereignty to an international decisionmaker. So, there has been a historic
move away from the approach that the United States has endorsed, which
has been internationalist, globalization-oriented. There is a fundamental
shift, and obviously the next election could determine where this goes next.
I would only add one other thing, which is that we are now in an unusual
environment where effectively the right wing of the Republican party and
the left wing of the Democratic party seem to be aligned in their opposition
to key elements of free trade agreements. So, I will put in quotation marks,
the “populist wings” of the two parties are aligned against this. Whereas, for
the past twenty-five years, basically since the Cold War, there has been a
centrist, bipartisan consensus at the executive branch level; whatever people
say during elections. At implementation time it is been somewhat of a
consistent bipartisan approach. So, we do not know. The same as we do not
know, “Where is Brexit going to lead us? Where is NAFTA going to lead
us?” We could be in a very ugly debate right now with the Democratic
House, obviously, with great tension with the White House. Is there a risk
of a hard exit from NAFTA? What would that mean? I think that the jury is
out, and I think that we need to step very carefully because Humpty Dumpty
is breaking in front of eyes, and that could have a lot of repercussions if we
are not careful.
M2: To echo what P2 said, a little less diplomatically, whenever you find
Donald Trump and Elizabeth Warren in agreement, you should be very
concerned.
M2: So, on that cheery note, I think we are right on track to finish at 11:45
AM on schedule. So, thank you again to the BLR. Now that I know the
proper abbreviation to refer to you all as. Thank you to you all in the
audience for being here. Thank you to the panelists, and it is a great event.
I am very glad to be here for it. Thank you.

